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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we combined the two problems; the shortest vector problems
(SVP) in p{adic lattices and the simultaneous approximation problems (SAP) of
p{adic numbers, by using the geometry of $p$-adic numbers as the glue. These two
problems have the computational complexity, NP-hardness or NP-completeness.
The security of the modern cryptosystems is based on the hardness of these
problems and the lattice-based cryptography is considered as the most powerful
post-quantum cryptography. In the usual real numbers case the inhomogeneous
simultaneous approximations problems (ISAP), which are NP-complete, are used
to construct cryptographic systems. Showing the relations between the shortest
vectors in the p{adic approximation lattices and the integer solutions of $p$-adic
SAP or ISAP, we propose a new cryptosystem given by using SAP or ISAP.
We construct multi-dimensional $p$-adic approximation lattices by simultaneous
rational approximations of $p$-adic numbers. For analyging these $p$-adic lattices
we apply the LLL algorithm due to Lenstra, Lenstra and Lov\'asz, which has been
widely used to solve the various NP problems such as SVP (Shortest Vector
Problems), ILP (Integer Linear Programing).. and so on. Theoretically it is
known that the LLL algorithm appr\`oximately solves SVP within a factor of $2^{O(n)}$
for the lattice dimension $n(\geq 3)$ in polynomial times. Using the LLL reduction
algorithm in the open source software Sage, we numerically show that these SVP
or SAP solutions of the lattice dimensions under 60 satisfy these exact estimates
in the $l_{\infty}$ norm.
In the second part, using these numerical results we propose a new lattice
based cryptosystem where we choose a $n$-tuple of -adic integers as public keys
and we set the SAP solutions of these numbers as private keys. Since we can
numerically show that the $l_{\infty}$ norms of the SVP solutions given by LLL in the
lattices of dimensions over 60 exceed the boundary value $p^{m/(n+1)}$ of the SAP
solutions, the private keys given in the lattices of dimensions over this value are
considered to be secure for the attacks by LLL.
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Our plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the $p$-adic
approximation lattices and we estimate the $l_{\infty}$ norm of p{adic SAP solutions. In
Section 3 we give the numerical estimates of the SAP solutions by using the LLL
reduction algorithm. In Section 4 and 5 we propose new cryptosystems based on
the results in the preceding sections.
2. $p$-ADIC LATTICE
In this section we introduce $p$-adic approximation lattices and investigate si-
multaneous rational approximations of $p$-adic numbers. Let $p$ be a xed rational
prime number and $|\cdot|_{p}$ be the corresponding p{adic valuation, normalized so that
$|p|_{p}=p^{-1}$ The completion of $\mathbb{Q}$ w.r.t. $|\cdot|_{p}$ is called the eld of p{adic numbers,
denoted by $\mathbb{Q}_{p}$ . The strong triangle inequality
$|a+b|_{p} \leq\max\{|a|_{p}, |b|_{p}\}, a, b\in \mathbb{Q}_{p}$
is most important and essential to construct $p$-adic approximation lattices. The
set of $p\mapsto$-adic integers is dened by $\mathbb{Z}_{p}=\{z\in \mathbb{Q}_{p}:|z|_{p}\leq 1\}.$
Let $n\geq 1$ be an integer and let $\Xi=\{\xi_{1}, \xi_{2}, . . . , \xi_{n}\}$ be a $n$-tuple of $p$-adic
integers.
Denition 2.1. We denote by $w_{n}(\Xi)$ the supremum of the real numbers $w$
such that, for some innitely many real numbers $X_{j}$ , which goes to innity, the
inequalities
$0<|a_{0,j}+a_{1,j}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n,j}\xi_{n}|_{p}\leq X_{j}^{-w-1},$
$\max_{0\leq i\leq n}|a_{i,j}|\leq X_{j},$
have a solution in integers $a_{0,j},$ $a_{1,j}$ , . . . , $a_{n,j}.$
For a positive integer $m$ we dene the $p$-adic approximation lattice $\Gamma_{m}$ by
(2.1) $\Gamma_{m}=\{(a_{0}, a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n})\in \mathbb{Z}^{n+1} : |a_{0}+a_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n}\xi_{n}|_{p}\leq p^{-m}\}.$
When a $p$-adic integer $\xi_{i}$ has the $p$-adic expansion
$\xi_{i}=\sum_{k=0}^{\infty}x_{i,k}p^{k}, 0\leq x_{i,k}\leq p-1,$
let $\xi_{i,m}$ be the m-th order approximation of $\xi_{i}$ dened by
(2.2) $\xi_{i,m}=\sum_{k=0}^{m-1}x_{i,k}p^{k}$
Consider the basis $\{b_{0,m}, b_{1,m}, . . . , b_{n,m}\}\subset \mathbb{Z}^{n+1}$ of the lattice $\Gamma_{m}$ given by
$b_{0,m}=(p^{m}, 0, \ldots, 0)^{t}, b_{1,m}=(\xi_{1,m}, -1,0, \ldots, 0)^{t},$
$b_{2,m}=(\xi_{2,m}, 0, -1,0, \ldots, 0)^{t}, \cdots, b_{n,m}=(\xi_{n,m}, 0, \ldots, 0, -1)^{t}.$
In fact, we have $b_{k,m}\in\Gamma_{m},$ $\forall k$ , since we can estimate
$|\xi_{k,m}-\xi_{k}|_{p}\leq p^{-m}$
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For $B_{m}=(b_{0,m}b_{1,m}\ldots b_{n,m})$ we have
$B_{m}=(\begin{array}{lllll}p^{m} \xi_{1,m} \xi_{2,m} \cdots \xi_{n,m}0 -1 0 \cdots 00 0 -1 \cdots 0\vdots \vdots \vdots \ddots \vdots 0 0 0 \cdots -1\end{array}), |\det(B_{m})|=p^{m}$
Applying the LLL algorithm for $\delta\in(1/4,1)$ , we denote $\{b_{0}, b_{1}, . . . , b_{n}\}$ a re-
duced basis and $B=$ $(b_{0}b_{1}. . . b_{n})$ . It is known that the shortest vector $b_{0}$ in $B$
satises
(2.3) $\Vert b_{0}\Vert_{2} \leq \sqrt{n+1}|\det(B)|^{\frac{1}{n+1}}(\frac{2}{\sqrt{4\delta-1}})^{n}$
$= \sqrt{n+1}|\det(B_{m})|^{\frac{1}{n+1}}(\frac{2}{\sqrt{4\delta-1}})^{n}$
$= \sqrt{n+1}p^{\frac{m}{n+1}}(\frac{2}{\sqrt{4\delta-1}})^{n}$
Now we estimate the minimum norm value $\lambda_{1}^{(\infty)}(\Gamma_{m})(=\lambda_{1}^{(\infty)}(B_{m}))$ by using
the famous Dirichlet principle.
Theorem 2.2. For a $n$ -tuple of $p$ -adic integers $=\{\xi_{1}, . . . , \xi_{n}\}$ , which are
irrational and linearly independent over $\mathbb{Q}$ , and each positive integer $m$ , there
exists a solution in integers $a_{0,m},$ $a_{1,m}$ , . . . , $a_{n,m}\in \mathbb{Z}^{n+1}$ , which satises
(2.4) $0<|a_{0_{7}n}+a_{1,m}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n,m}\xi_{n}|_{p}\leq p^{-m},$
(2.5) $0 \leq i\leq n\max|a_{i,m}|\leq p^{\frac{m}{n+1}}.$
Consequently, we have
(2.6) $\lambda_{1}^{(\infty)}(\Gamma_{m})\leq p^{\frac{m}{n+1}}=\det(\Gamma_{m})^{\frac{1}{n+1}}.$
3. NUMERICAL CALCULATIONS ON SAP
In this section, we compare the minimum norms of the vectors given by the LLL
reduction algorithm and the upper bound of the norms of the shortest vectors
$X_{m}:=p^{m/(n+1)}$ given in Theorem 2.2, using the open source software Sage. We
investigate the following case.
$p=13$ : prime number,
$\xi_{i}=u^{\frac{1}{i103}}$ : $p$-adic number, $103rd$ root of $u_{i}$ :
11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54,
55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75,
76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97
$m=5$ , 6, . . . , 40: approximation orders
$n=20$ , 60, 80: dimensions
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First we show our numerical process by using the small parameters, $n=10,$
$\xi_{i}=u^{\frac{1}{i103}},$ $m=5$ . For the approximation order $m=5$ and the dimension $n=10,$
we apply the LLL reduction $(\delta=0.99999)$ . Then we obtain the reduced basis $B$
from $B_{m}$ . Here we note that the basis is given by row vectors in Sage.
$B_{m}=(_{36}34_{6035}^{4671}15963407282822182862721283783712931254006311 -10000000000 -10000000000 -10000000000 -10000000000 -10000000000-10000000000-10000000000-10000000000-10000000000-10000000000]$
$B=(-1001120001-1-2-1-1-1-100111 -1-1-2-2-1002211 -1-1-1-12010022-1-1-2-10121001-1-1-100000121-1-2-1-20021001-1-3-1-1-1000001-2-2-1-10021011-2-1-2-2-1-1-13212 -2-1-1-12001001)$
We obtain
$\min_{0\leq i\leq n}\Vert b_{i}\Vert_{2}=3.60555\ldots, 0\leq i\leq n\max\Vertb_{i}\Vert_{2}=4.35889\ldots,$
$\min_{0\leq i\leq n}\Vert b_{i}\Vert_{\infty}=2, \max_{0\leq i\leq n}\Vert b_{i}\Vert_{\infty}=3,$
which are suciently eective solutions of SVP, smaller than the value $X_{m}=$
$p^{m/(n+1)}=3.208764\ldots$ , comparing the theoretical estimate (2.6) in Theorem 2.2
$\lambda_{1}^{(\infty)}(\Gamma_{m})\leq p^{\frac{m}{n+1}}=\det(\Gamma_{m})^{\frac{1}{n+1}}.$
Next we give the graphs which compare these numerical minimum and max-
imum values in the $l_{\infty}$ norm and the minimum values in the $l_{2}$ norm for the
shortest vectors given by the LLL reduction basis and the values $X_{m}$ for the
approximation orders $m$ from 5 to 40 and the dimensions $n=20$ , 60, 80.
Since the LLL reduction algorithm approximately nds the shortest vectors
in the $l_{2}$ norm, we use their $l_{\infty}$ norm values as the substitutes of the shortest
vectors in the $l_{\infty}$ norm. We use the following line styles in the graphs.
$-\cdot-\cdot-\cdot-\cdot$ : minimum norm values of the reduced basis vectors in $l_{2}$
- - - - - - - - : maximum norm values of the reduced basis vectors in $l_{\infty}$
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$:X_{m}=p^{m/(n+1)}$
.. . . . . . . . . . . : minimum norm values of the reduced basis vectors in $l_{\infty}$
These graphs show that the LLL algorithm is eective enough to obtain the
solutions of SAP, which satisfy the estimate (2.6), if the dimension $n$ is under 60
(see Figure 1 and 2), but this estimate is not satised for some $m$ if $n>60$ and






In this section we propose a new cryptosystem, the security of which depends
on the hardness of solving the SAP. Now we assume that Alice wants to send a
message to Bob in this cryptosystem.
Key generation
First, we choose a prime number $p$ and $m\in \mathbb{N}$ , which are the common private
keys of Alice and Bob.. For a public key we set a $l$-tuple of $p-\dot{a}dic$ integers
$\{\eta_{1}, . . . , \eta_{l}\}$ , which satises
(4.1) $|\eta_{1}|_{p}>|\eta_{2}|_{p}>\cdots>|\eta_{l}|_{p}, \eta:=(\eta_{1}, \ldots, \eta_{l})$ ,
and we construct a $n$-tuple of irrational $p$-adic integers $\{\xi_{1}, . . . , \xi_{n}\}$ as a pub-
lic key, linearly independent over $\mathbb{Q}$ , and a $n+1$-tuple of rational integers
$\{a_{0}, a_{1}, . . . , a_{n}\}$ as a secret key, which satises $|a_{i}|\leq p^{m/(n+1)},$ $i=0$ , . . . , $n$ and
$|a_{0}+a_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n}\xi_{n}|_{p}\leq p^{-m}$ as follows.
We randomly choose the integers $a_{0}$ , . . . , $a_{n-1}$ which satisfy the condition $|a_{i}|\leq$
$p^{m/(n+1)},$ $i=0$ , . . . , $n-1$ , and put $a_{n}=1$ . Next we randomly choose a linearly
independent $n$-tuple of -adic integers $\{\xi_{0}, \xi_{1}, . . . , \xi_{n-1}\}$ , satisfying $|\xi_{0}|_{p}\leq p^{-m},$
and we dene $\xi_{n}$ by $\xi_{n}=\xi_{0}-(a_{0}+a_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n-1}\xi_{n-1})$ . Then we have $|\xi_{n}+$
$(a_{0}+a_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n-1}\xi_{n-1})|_{p}\leq p^{-m}$ . Thus the set of these integers $\{a_{0}, . . . , a_{n}\}$
becomes a solution of SAP :
(4.2) $0<a_{0}+a_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n}\xi_{n}|_{p}\leq p^{-m},$
(4.3) $\max_{0\leq i\leq n}|a_{i}|\leq p^{\frac{m}{n+1}}.$




For a plaintext $x=(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{l})\in\{0, 1\}^{l}$ , Alice constructs its linear combina-
tion as a part of ciphertext $c_{0}$ by
$c_{0}:=x\cdot\eta=\sum_{i=1}^{l}x_{i}\eta_{i}.$
By using $\eta=(\eta_{1}, \ldots, \eta_{l})$ , which satises (4.1), instead of the superincreasing
sequence in the Knapsack cryptosystem Bob can easily decrypt the ciphertext $c_{0}$
into the plaintext $x.$
Alice constructs her ciphertext $c$ by
$c=p^{-m}(a_{0}+a_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n}\xi_{n})+c_{0}$
and she sends $c$ to Bob.
Decryption
Bob obtains the part of the ciphertext $c_{0}$ by using the public keys and the
secret key from the ciphertext $c.$
$c-p^{-m}(a_{0}+a_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+a_{n}\xi_{n})=c_{0}=x\cdot\eta.$
The plaintext $x$ is recovered from $c_{0}$ step by steps as follows.
lst-step: If $|c_{0}|_{p}\geq|\eta_{1}|_{p}$ , then $x_{1}=1$ , otherwise $x_{1}=0.$
$2nd-step$ : If $|c_{0}-x_{1}\eta_{1}|_{p}\geq|\eta_{2}|_{p}$ , then $x_{2}=1$ , otherwise $x_{2}=0.$
:
lth-step: If $|c_{0}-(x_{1}\eta_{1}+\cdots+x_{l-1}\eta_{l-1})|_{p}\geq|\eta_{l}|_{p}$ , then $x_{l}=1$ , otherwise
$x_{l}=0.$
5. CRYPTOSYSTEM II (PRACTICAL VARIATIONS)
In this section we give some practical variations of Cryptosystem I to increase
its security. Instead of the public keys of $p$-adic integers $\eta_{1}$ , . . . , $\eta_{l}$ , p{adic abso-
lute values of which are decreasing, let $\eta_{1}$ , . . . , $\eta_{l}$ , be units and consider the two
common secret keys, a permutation $\varphi(i)$ : $\{$ 1, . . . , $l\}arrow\{1, . . . , l\}$ and a strictly
increasing sequence of positive integers $\{m_{i}\}_{1\leq i\leq l}$ : $m_{1}<m_{2}<\cdots<m_{l}<m.$
Let the secret key $a_{i}$ be the sum of $\alpha_{i}$ and $\beta_{i}$ , that is
$a_{i}=\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i},$ $\alpha_{i},$ $\beta_{i}\in \mathbb{Z},$ $i=0$ , 1, . . . , $n.$
Alice has the secret key $\{\alpha_{i}\}$ and Bob has the secret key $\{\beta_{i}\}.$
Encryption
Alice constructs the part of the ciphertext $c_{0}$ by
$c_{0}=\sum_{i=1}^{l}x_{i}p^{m_{\varphi(i)}}\eta_{\varphi(i)}.$




Bob takes the sum of $c_{A}$ and the linear combination of $\{\xi_{1}, . . . , \xi_{n}\}$ with his
secret key. Then he has
$c_{A}+\beta_{0}+\beta_{1}\xi_{1}+\cdots+\beta_{n}\xi_{n}$ $=$ $a_{0}+ \sum_{j=1}^{n}a_{j}\xi_{j}+\sum_{i=1}^{l}x_{\varphi^{-1}(i)}p^{m_{i}}\eta_{i}:=c_{B}.$
Since $(a_{0}, \ldots, a_{n})$ is an integer solution of the SAP and $m>m_{l}>\cdots>m_{1}$ , it
follows from the isosceles principle that
$| c_{B}|_{p}=|a_{0}+\sum_{j=1}^{n}a_{j}\xi_{j}+\sum_{i=1}^{l}x_{\varphi^{-1}}p^{m_{i}}\eta_{i}|_{p}=|\sum_{i=1}^{l}x_{\varphi^{-1}}$
if $x\neq(0,0, \ldots, 0)$ .
The plaintext $x$ is recovered from $c_{B}$ step by steps and Bob can easily recover
the message $x$ from $c_{0}$ by using the secret keys $\varphi(i)$ , $\{m_{i}\}$ and the Knapsack type
procedure.
REFERENCES
1. Y.Bugeaud, \Approximation by Algebraic Numbers Cambridge Tracts in Mathematics,
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
2. J.W.S.Cassels, \An introduction to Diophantine approximation Cambridge Tract 45,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957
3. Y.A.Khinchin, \Continued Fractions", the University of Chicago Press 1964. 28 $\#$ 5037
4. D. Micciancio and S. Goldwasser, \Complexity of Lattice Problems, a Cryptographic Per-
spective Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science, vol. 671.
Springer, 2002
5. P.Q. Nguyen and B. Vallee (Eds.), \The LLL Algorithm, Survey and Applications
Springer 2010.
6. W.M.Schmidt, \Diophantine Approximation Springer Lecture Notes in Math. 785, 1980.
7. V.G. Sprind\v{z}uk, Mahler's problem in metric number theory. Izdat. \Nauka i Tehnika
Minsk, 1967 (in Russian). English translation by B. Volkmann, Translations of Mathemat-
ical Monographs, Vol. 25, American Mathematical Society, Providence, R.I., 1969
Department of Applied Mathematics,
Graduate School of Science and Technology,
Kumamoto University,
Kurokami 2-39-1, Kumamoto, Japan
132d9307@st.kumamoto-u.ac.jp
knaito@gpo.kumamoto-u.ac.jp
$\prime gg*\lambda'*\neq^{\mapsto}\lambda\not\in\beta_{\pi}^{a}\cdot\Xi \mathfrak{V}_{\backslash \backslash }\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{\underline{\backslash }}^{\backslash }\}^{\prime^{1\mapsto\infty\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{\backslash }^{\backslash }\dagger}}\neq ffl_{J\iota}, \pi\iota 7$
$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}*x_{\mp^{4}}^{is}|x_{\neq}^{\succ\prec}\beta_{\pi}^{a}\cdot\Xi ffl_{\backslash \backslash }\# 4'\mp^{36}ffl_{P\iota}^{\infty}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{\backslash }4$ hi $\doteqdot-E\beta$
23
